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Abstract
This paper seeks to explore the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh under the leadership of Daud 
Beureu’eh, particularly the main factors which instigated the rebellion, the dynamics which took 
place during the rebellion, and the end of the rebellion. The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh occurred 
because of several factors. Firstly, the people of Aceh were disappointed with the central government 
of Indonesia which failed to fulfill its promise to grant Aceh special autonomy. Secondly, there was a 
clash between the ulemas (Moslem clerics) faction who supported the autonomy and the uléëbalangs 
(customary leaders) who opposed the autonomy because they did not want the ulemas to assume 
dominance in the government of Aceh. Third, the Indonesian central government at that time was 
adopting a parliamentary system which was highly unstable and inconsistent in its perspective on 
and treatment of Aceh. The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh is considered unique in that it did not 
claim as many lives as other Darul Islam rebellions in various regions throughout Indonesia. This 
rebellion effectively ended on May 8, 1962. In order to bring this conflict to a speedy end, the central 
government gave up military operations and sought for political settlement andamicable dialogues 
with DI/TII to reach a consensus concerning the Aceh problem. Peace in Aceh was secured after 
the central government decided to grant Aceh the status of Daerah Istimewa (Special Region), 
which meant that Aceh was given the right to exercise a special autonomy in the areas of religion, 
education, and tradition.
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Abstrak
Tulisan berusaha menjelaskan tentang pemberontakan Darul Islam pimpinan Daud Beureu’eh di 
Aceh, terutama terkait dengan faktor utama pemicu terjadinya pemberontakan, dinamika, dan akhir 
dari pemberontakan tersebut. Pemberontakan Darul Islam di Aceh terjadi karena beberapa faktor. 
Pertama, rakyat Aceh merasa bahwa pemerintah pusat Indonesia tidak menepati janjinya untuk 
memberikan otonomi khusus buat Aceh. Kedua, adanya pertentangan antara ulama yang mendukung 
status otonomi dan ulibalang yang menentang otonomi karena mereka tidak menginginkan ulama 
menjadi dominan dalam pemerintahan Aceh. Ketiga, pemerintah pusat Indonesia saat itu menerapkan 
sistem pemerintahan parlementer yang ternyata menciptakan ketidakstabilan dan inkonsistensi 
dalam memperlakukan Aceh. Pemberontakan Darul Islam di Aceh dianggap unik dibandingkan 
dengan pemberontakan Darul Islam di daerah yang lain di Indonesia. Pemberontakan ini berakhir 
pada tanggal 8 Mei 1962. Agar konflik ini segera berakhir, pemerintah pusat menghentikan operasi 
militer dan memandang bahwa pendekatan politik bisa dilakukan melalui dialog dengan gerakan 
DI/TII untuk menemukan konsensus dalam menyelesaikan masalah Aceh. Perdamaian di Aceh baru 
dapat dicapai setelah pemerintah pusat memutuskan untuk memberikan status Daerah Istimewa, 
yakni Aceh diberi hak khusus untuk mengatur masalah keagamaan, pendidikan, dan budaya.
Kata kunci: Aceh, Daud Beureu’eh, Darul Islam, PUSA
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A. Introduction
It is understandable that the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(RI), in the early years of the country’s 
independence, had not been able to 
accommodate all aspirations of its people 
and regions. It is understandable that the 
people living in a particular region—who 
had their own history and had maintained 
their distinctive customs for a great 
many years before the independence 
of the Indonesian Republic—wanted 
the central government to acknowledge 
their existence. It is also understandable 
that, out of disappointment, members 
of a community or a region decided 
to take a radical measure or even to 
launch a rebellion in order to achieve 
their aspirations. Nevertheless, the 
best way to solve such matters is by 
sitting together to find mutual solutions 
which are necessary for creating peace 
throughout the nation and for fostering 
trust between the regional and central 
governments.
This paper seeks to explore 
three main subjects: the background 
of the emergence of the Darul Islam/
Tentara Nasional Indonesia or DI/TII 
(Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of 
Indonesia) rebellion in Aceh, the progress 
of the rebellion, and the policies adopted 
by the government of the Indonesian 
Republic to deal with the rebellion from 
its beginning to its end. The causes of 
DI/TII rebellion in Aceh can be divided 
into two categories: external factors and 
internal factors. One external factor is 
the fact that the central government 
failed to accommodate the aspirations 
of the Aceh people. The Aceh people 
were disappointed with the central 
government who did not grant their wish 
to make Aceh a separate province or a 
special autonomous region. On behalf 
of the Aceh people, the leader of Darul 
Islam in Aceh, Teungku Mohammad 
Daud Beureu’eh, asserted the same 
demand. Using his great influence among 
the Aceh people, he had previously 
assisted the Indonesian government in 
fighting against the Dutch colonizers 
and in collecting money from the Aceh 
people when the central government was 
in need of funds. Because of his great 
contributions, Daud Beureu’eh was 
once appointed as the Military Governor 
of Aceh by the central government, but 
then he turned against the government 
out of disappointment. Another external 
factor instigating the DI/TII rebellion in 
Aceh is the political condition at national 
level. The conflict between Partai 
Nasional Indonesia or PNI (Indonesian 
National Party) and Masyumi Party 
also affected the Aceh people, most of 
whom were the supporters of Masyumi. 
When Masyumi’s influence was 
suppressed during Ali Sastroamidjodjo’s 
administration, the rebellion in Aceh 
erupted.
One internal factor is the conflict 
between the ulemas(Moslem clerics) and 
the uléëbalangs (customary leaders). 
The ulemas and the uléëbalangs were 
actually the two most important pillars 
in the Aceh society. The uléëbalangs 
played a great role in maintaining the 
practice of customary laws and in 
governing certain regions, whereas the 
ulemas played a great role in maintaining 
the practice of Islamic laws. In the early 
stages of Indonesian revolution and 
independence, the ulemas gained more 
influence within the Aceh society to the 
point that they gradually dominated the 
government of Aceh at the expense of 
the uléëbalangs. In order to reclaim their 
power, the uléëbalangs took the side of 
the central government and opposed the 
ulemas’ aspiration to form a separate 
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province of Aceh.
On December 23, 1950, Persatuan 
Seluruh Ulama Aceh or PUSA (All 
Aceh Islamic Scholars Association) 
held a congress in Kutaraja which 
resulted in several decisions, one of 
which was a common aspiration to form 
an autonomous region for the people 
of Aceh. In order to strengthen his 
position, Daud Beureu’eh established 
a relationship with S. M. Kartosuwiryo 
who in turn asked him to become the 
Governor of Darul Islam in Aceh. In 
December 1953, approximately one 
hundred representatives from various 
areas in Aceh attended a meeting which 
was convened in Daud Beureu’eh’s 
residence. The meeting discussed 
strategies for carrying out a coup d’état 
and for establishing a military region. 
The meeting was followed up by the 
proclamation of the establishment of 
Negara Islam Indonesia or NII (Islamic 
State of Indonesia) by DI/TII on 
December 20, 1953.
The proclamation of the Islamic 
State of Indonesia in Aceh was met 
with various reactions. PKI and PNI, 
two staunch political opponents of 
PUSA, suggested that the DI/TII 
rebellion had to be crushed by a military 
offensive. Partai Komunis Indonesia or 
PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) 
urged the government to establish a 
movement called Anti Teror Aceh or 
ATA (Antiterrorist Movement in Aceh) 
in which the civilians were to be armed 
against the rebels. Meanwhile, Partai 
Nasional Indonesia or PNI (Indonesian 
National Party) established a “Front 
Nasional” (“National Front”), which 
was then renamed Gabungan Partai-
Partai dan Organisasi or GPO (Alliance 
of Political Parties and Organizations), 
and urged the government to launch 
“Pagar Desa” (literally “Village Fence”) 
movement in which the villagers were 
to be armed to protect their boundaries. 
In response to the DI/TII rebellion in 
Aceh, the government of the Republic 
of Indonesia conducted a meeting which 
was attended by the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the Minister of Defense, the 
Attorney General, the ArmyChief of 
Staff of Indonesia, and the National 
Police Chief. The meeting decided that 
the central government would launch a 
large-scale military operationin Aceh. In 
response to the decision, the Commander 
of Regiment I Infantry in Kutaraja asked 
the Aceh people to remain calm and to 
support the government in quenching 
the rebellion.
Islamic parties such as Masyumi 
suggested a more peaceful solution to 
the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. Meanwhile, 
the ulemas in Aceh who disagreed 
with Daud Beureu’eh’s actions tried to 
persuade the people to believe that the 
actions taken by Daud Beureu’eh and his 
followers were wrong. They encouraged 
the people not to participate in the 
rebellion and to choose the right course 
of action, that is, to support the Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia and its 
government. Those ulemas and Islamic 
parties believed that DI/TII rebellion did 
not occur because the Aceh people hated 
the central government in the first place. 
Indeed, during the struggle period, the 
Aceh people provided considerable 
support to the Indonesian Republic.
The government took several 
measures to deal with the rebellion: 
limiting the movement of the rebels, 
improving the defense throughout Aceh, 
strengthening military posts, securing 
postal and logistic routes, and sending 
new troops to increase the number of 
those already posted to Aceh. In addition 
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to that, the government also offered 
scholarships for Acehnese students who 
studied outside Aceh. The Indonesian 
government also encouraged clerics 
who did not side with the rebels to help 
persuade the people not to participate 
in the rebellion. The government also 
promised that, when the situation is back 
to normal, they would bring development 
to Aceh in all areas, particularly in the 
form of railways and roads.
In August 1961, the central gov-
ernment and DI/TII Aceh initiated a 
peace dialogue. The central government 
sent a delegation of twenty eight people 
which consisted of several regents, cler-
ics, army officers, and police officers to 
Daud Beureu’eh’s quarters in East Aceh. 
After the meeting was concluded, many 
rebels surrendered to the government 
in Kutaraja. The government, through 
its delegation, agreed withDaud Beu-
reu’eh’s terms that the Sharia law (Is-
lamic law) was to be adopted in Aceh. 
This agreement was then officially en-
acted on April 7, 1962 with the approval 
of the Regional People’s Representative 
Council. After a long journey towards 
peace, Daud Beureu’eheventually re-
turned to Kutaraja on May 8, 1962. Daud 
Beureu’eh solemnly announced that, by 
the order of his people, he now returned 
to his people. He also declared that the 
enmity which had been raging between 
his group and the Indonesian govern-
mentfor eight years, ten months, and 
twenty seven days officially ended that 
day. Negotiations and peaceful measures 
proved effective in ending the rebellion 
in Aceh. A highly popular policy called 
“Konsepsi Prinsipil Bijaksana” (literal-
ly “Wise Principal Conception”) which 
was proposed by Sjamaun Gaharu and 
was adopted by the regional government 
proved to be able to suppress the rebel-
lion. It was the right decision on the part 
of the government, considering the fact 
that Daud Beureu’eh and the Aceh peo-
ple had made great contributions to the 
country and that DI/TII Aceh was will-
ing to settle the problem through peace-
ful consensus.
B. Discussion
1. Causes of the Rebellion
The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh 
erupted because the Aceh people were 
disappointed with the central government 
of Indonesia. This disappointment can 
be traced back to the moment when 
President Soekarno gave his promise 
to the Aceh people, and this promise 
was recorded in a conversation between 
Soekarno and Daud Beureu’ehwhich 
took place in 1948. In the conversation, 
Soekarno asked the Aceh people, 
through Daud Beureu’eh,to provide 
the Indonesian government with the 
much needed supplies for maintaining 
the independence of the Indonesian 
Republic. Daud Beureu’eh granted 
Soekarno’s wish, and Soekarno in return 
granted Aceh a special autonomy status.
Therefore, it is true that Aceh was 
once granted the status of a province 
with special autonomy. The President’s 
promise was thus fulfilled by the 
issuance of Deputy Prime Minister’s 
Regulation in Lieu of Government’s 
Regulation Number 8/Des/WKPM/1949 
on December 17, 1949 by the Deputy 
Prime Minister Sjafrudin Prawiranegara. 
The Decision Letter mandated the 
establishment of the Province of Aceh 
which covered the whole area of the 
former Aceh Residence and a part 
of Langkat Regency. However, the 
regulation proved to be contentious. 
The regulation was opposed not only 
by the opponents of PUSA, especially 
the uléëbalangs, but also by the 
Buletin Al-Turas 
Mimbar Sejarah,Sastra,Budaya, dan Agama - Vol. XXII No.1, Januari 2016
149
government officials in North Sumatra 
Province, as well as the government of 
the Indonesian Republic in Yogyakarta. 
In addition to that, the regulation was 
considered to be in contravention of 
the RIS (Republic of the United States 
of Indonesia)-RI agreement which 
stipulated that Indonesia consisted of 
only ten provinces, three of which were 
located in the island of Sumatra, but 
Aceh was not one of them.2
The new government in 
Yogyakarta, under the Prime Minister 
Abdul Halim, rejected the establishment 
of the Aceh Province. Indonesian 
leaders in Yogyakarta thought that the 
establishment of a new province in North 
Sumatra was unconstitutional because 
Deputy Prime Minister Sjafrudin 
announced the establishment of the Aceh 
Province three days after the Second 
Hatta Cabinet had been abolished on 
December 2, 1949. Sjafrudin justified his 
decision by arguing that he had obtained 
Hatta’s approval, but the government 
did not accept this. The government then 
demonstrated its refusal to acknowledge 
the establishment of a new province 
in North Sumatra by not sending any 
representative to the inauguration of 
Daud Beureu’eh on January 30, 1950.3
In spite of many oppositions, the 
government of Aceh Province kept ruling 
the province de facto, while the central 
government did not take any decisive 
action with regard to the de jure status 
of the Aceh Province. Meanwhile,the 
Federal Government of Republik 
Indonesia Serikat or RIS(Republic 
of the United States of Indonesia) in 
Jakarta decided not to meddle with 
2Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum 
Republik, Kasus Darul Islam, Jakarta: Gravi-
ti,1990, pp. 35-39.
3Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik,p. 
36.
the issue of the Aceh Province, which 
was part of the Republic of Indonesia, 
whose government was situated in 
Yogyakarta. Both State Prime Minister 
Halim in Yogyakarta and Federal 
Prime Minister Hatta in Jakarta tried 
their best not to demonstrate any sign 
of direct opposition to the demands of 
the Aceh people; they wanted to avoid 
confrontation with the Aceh people 
because they were focusing on achieving 
a more important goal, which was the 
establishment of the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Therefore,both 
Prime Ministersdecided to delay any 
effort to settle the Aceh problem.4
Because of that reason, Halim’s 
government in Yogyakarta did not issue 
any public statement until it formed an 
investigation commission led by Susanto 
Tirtoprojo, the Minister of Home Affairs. 
This commission was sent to Aceh in 
mid-March 1950 to investigate the case.5 
Susanto very carefully explained to the 
Aceh people that the central government 
had not decided anything with regards to 
the establishment of the Aceh Province 
and that more information was needed 
before Yogyakarta could take any 
definitive decision.6
In the middle of May 1950, RIS 
and RI reached an agreement on the 
establishment of a unitary state. The 
agreement stipulated that Sumatra 
Island only consisted of three provinces 
without Aceh, because the area was 
considered as part of the North Sumatra 
Province. To implement this agreement, 
the government established Panitia 
Penyelenggaraan Pembentukan 
4Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, 
p. 40. 
5S. M. Amin, Sekitar Peristiwa Berdarah di At-
jeh, Jakarta: Soeroengan NV, 1956, p. 29.
6Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik: 
p. 41.
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Provinsi Sumatera Utara or P4SU 
(Committee for the Implementation of 
the Establishment of the Province of 
North Sumatra) on August 1. As an effort 
to recognize the heterogeneity of the 
people of North Sumatra, the government 
appointed Raden Sarimin Reksodiharjo 
(a Javanese) to head Panitia Persiapan 
Pendirian Provinsi Sumatera Utara or 
P4SU (Committee for the Preparation 
for the Establishment of the Province of 
North Sumatra), while Teuku Daudsyah 
(an Acehnese), Radja Kaliamsah Sinaga 
(a Toba Bataknese), and Bina Siregar (a 
Mandailing Bataknese) were elected as 
members.7
Meanwhile, Mohammad Hatta as 
the leader of the Indonesian parliament 
felt a need to reorganize the provinces, 
so that all regions in Indonesia could be 
managed in a more efficient way. Hatta 
realized the importance of establishing 
a unitary state. Besides that, his cabinet 
still had to pay a debt of 1,130 million 
dollars, a legacy of the Dutch East 
Indies administration which had to be 
borne by the Indonesian government in 
accordance with the results of the Dutch-
Indonesian Round Table Conference. 
Because of this, the government was 
compelled to cut expenditures by, 
for instance, limiting the number of 
provinces.8
The people of Aceh protested 
against this decision. They argued that 
Aceh could not be managed by the 
government of North Sumatra Province 
because both regions had different 
aspirations. The progress of development 
in Aceh was considered slower than 
in any other provinces, so the region 
needed to have its own government to 
7Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republikp. 
41.
8Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik,. 
p. 42.
help accelerate its development and to 
bring prosperity. Besides that, Aceh also 
had a unique historical background, 
having been able to maintain its 
existence as a unitary state for a long 
period of time. The people of Aceh 
had long been united under a sultanate, 
while Islam has become an integral part 
in the Aceh society. In order to support 
the protest, all government officials 
throughout Aceh threatened to organize 
a strike. This threat was then indicated 
in a motion9delivered by the Regional 
People’s Representative Council of 
Aceh on August 12, 1950.10
The government of the Indonesian 
Republic ignored the protest and issued 
Central Government’s Regulation 
in Lieu of Law Number 5 of August 
14, 1950. This Regulation effectively 
incorporated Aceh Province into North 
Sumatra Province. This action sparked 
further protest from the people of Aceh.11
In addition to the Aceh people’s 
disappointment with the central 
government, the conflict between the 
ulemas and the uléëbalangsalso played a 
9This motion included these following demands: 
(1) the central government has to maintain the 
Province of Aceh which had been established by 
Deputy Prime Minister Sjafrudin Prawiranega-
ra and (2) if Aceh is not allowed to become a 
separate province under the central government 
of the Indonesian Republic, the native people of 
Aceh who hold positions in the government and 
who share the same aspirations will return their 
mandate to the central government through the 
regional government. The motion also contained 
a long and detailed explanation concerning all 
the reasons why it was right and proper that 
Aceh should be granted autonomy and power to 
manage its own region.
10Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, 
p. 42.
11Muhammad Gade Ismail, Tantangan dan 
Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhandan Kesatuan 
Bangsa: Kasus Darul Islam di Aceh. Jakarta: 
Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah 
Nasional, 1992: 60.
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great role in steering the progress of the 
rebellion. The ulemas and the uléëbalangs 
are the two most important pillars in the 
Aceh society. The uléëbalangs played 
a great role in maintaining the practice 
of customary laws, whereas the ulemas 
played a great role in maintaining the 
practice of Islamic law. In other words, 
the uléëbalangs were customary leaders 
who had traditionally led certain regions 
in Aceh, whereas the ulemas were 
spiritual leaders.12
The conflict between those 
two groups can be traced back to the 
earlyyears of the revolution period. 
At that time, the ulemas exercised 
a powerful influence in the regional 
government of Aceh. This situation 
was resented by the uléëbalangs. They 
thought that the regional government 
during the revolution period had failed 
to revive and promote traditional values 
and customs among the Aceh people, 
and the uléëbalangs used this drawback 
as an excuse for seeking revenge. 
Threatened by the uléëbalangs’ action, 
the ulemas sought ways to maintain their 
power within the regional government. 
For that reason, they demanded a special 
autonomy for Aceh. In response to this, 
Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo said 
that the demand for autonomy was 
only their pretext for challenging the 
influence of the uléëbalangs.13
The conflict between the ulemas 
and the uléëbalangs had been taking 
place years before the Indonesian 
independence. The cause of this conflict 
was Dutch’s political policies. In order 
to occupy Aceh, the Dutch established 
relationships with the uléëbalangs and 
prevented the ulemas from entering the 
12Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan,p. 52.
13Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 52.
government. In this way, the power of the 
ulemas was suppressed.14 In spite of the 
suppression, the ulemas still exercised a 
great influence among the Aceh people. 
This was because the relationship 
between the ulemas and the Aceh people 
was not based on social bonds, but 
based on the spirit of fraternity as fellow 
Moslems. In contrast, the relationship 
between the uléëbalangs and the 
common people was comparable to 
the relationship between landlords and 
peasants. In addition to that, many of the 
uléëbalang’s actions were against the 
interests of the people. This diminished 
people’s support to the uléëbalangs.15
During the Japanese occupation 
period, the ulemas began to gain more 
influence in the regional government. 
The Japanese appointed some of the 
ulemas as members of Dewan Rakyat 
Aceh (People’s Council of Aceh). In 
addition to that, the ulemas were also 
given opportunities to hold positions 
in government offices and religious 
courts.16 In spite of this, the Japanese 
still used the service of the uléëbalangs 
to hold administrative positions in 
many areas.17After the Indonesian 
independence, the power of the 
ulemaswas gradually increasing. The 
people of Aceh supported the ulemas 
in fighting the Dutch colonizers. On 
October 15, 1945, the Aceh ulemas 
signed a pact which called upon the Aceh 
people to unite under the Supreme Leader 
14Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 54.
15Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 54.
16Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 54; and C. van Dijk, Darul Islam: 
Sebuah Pemberontakan. Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 
p. 257.
17Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 54.
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Soekarno as part of their commitment to 
maintain the independence of Indonesia. 
They also added a religious overtone to 
the struggle by describing it as perang 
sabil or a holy war.18
The conflict between the ulemas 
and the uléëbalangs continued when 
the ulemas’ demand for autonomy was 
ignored by the central government. 
Therefore, it is only natural that the 
uléëbalangs supported the central 
government because they opposed the 
idea of autonomy for Aceh. If Aceh were 
given autonomy, the ulemas would gain 
the upperhand, and this was precisely 
what the uléëbalangs did not want 
to happen. The conflict between the 
uléëbalangs and the ulemas did nothing 
but aggravated the situation, thus 
hampering any effort towards peace.
In addition to those two factors, 
the third factor instigating the Darul 
Islam rebellion in Aceh was the political 
situation at national level, especially the 
conflict between PNI and Masyumi.The 
conflict between these parties in turn 
affected the Aceh people as the supporters 
of Masyumi. When Masyumi’s 
influence was suppressed during Ali 
Sastroamidjodjo’s administration, the 
rebellion in Aceh erupted. From the 
perspective of the Aceh people, the 
rebellion was the manifestation of 
a common Islamic aspiration which 
was strongly tied to the dynamics of 
Masyumi’s influence in the central 
government. The Aceh people believed 
that any change in the composition of 
the parliament would certainly have 
an impact on the parliament’s policies 
on Aceh and its people. Therefore, in 
order to prevent against the enactment 
of policiesunfavorable to them, the Aceh 
people decided to take an immediate 
18Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p.55.
action in the form of a rebellion.19
2. Progress of the Rebellion
The Aceh people’s disappointment 
with the central government’s policy 
did not abate. In response to the Aceh 
people’s objection to Aceh being 
incorporated into the Province of 
North Sumatra, the government of the 
Indonesian Republic sent a delegation 
to Aceh20on September 26to discuss the 
matter. Led by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the delegation was personally 
welcomed by Daud Beureu’eh and Aceh 
leaders, but the discussion did not lead 
to any agreement.21 After that, Vice 
President Mohammad Hatta personally 
came to Aceh on December 23, 1950, 
but he was rejected by the Acehnese 
people.22
On December 23, 1950, PUSA held 
a congress in Kutaraja which resulted in 
several decisions. One of the decisions 
was that the Acehnese people still 
insisted on their demand for autonomy. 
Another decision was that the Acehnese 
people would take actions if the central 
government refused to fulfill the demand. 
The congress also discussed strategies 
to gather support for the people’s 
rebellion and revolution in Aceh.23 In 
such a volatile situation, on January 22, 
1951 Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir 
19Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik,, 
p. 4.
20This delegation consisted of Mr. Assaat (Min-
ister of Home Affairs), Sarimin Reksodiharjo 
(Deputy Governor of North Sumatra), and oth-
er top leaders from Medan. In addition to them, 
M. Nur El Ibrahimy also joined the delegation 
(Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 47).
21Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik,., 
p. 47.
22Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 47.
23Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan,p. 47.
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visited Aceh to persuade Aceh leaders to 
retract their demands. Even though the 
Prime Minister was not able to persuade 
the Acehnese leaders, the meeting 
nonetheless reduced the tension between 
Aceh and the central government.24
In addition to having a conflict 
with the Indonesian central government, 
PUSA also had a conflict with Badan 
Keinsyafan Rakyat or BKR (People’s 
Awareness Agency) which was 
established by the uléëbalangs. This 
body was established to support and 
help the central government in their 
effort to raise the people’s awareness 
of the central government’s policies 
concerning Aceh. This body also aimed 
to strengthen the relationship and 
communication between the people, the 
central government, and various groups 
in the region.25
While the conflict was still raging, 
a congress of all Indonesia Moslem 
clerics and scholars was convened in 
Medan from April 11 to 15, 1953. At the 
congress, Daud Beureu’eh in his speech 
expressed his view on the role of state 
in Islam. The ulemas there came to a 
conclusion that the central government 
had been discriminative against Aceh 
because it had undermined the role of 
the ulemas and their much-valued Sharia 
laws. The participants then declared 
their intention that, in the next general 
election, they would make an attempt to 
transform the Republic of Indonesia into 
an Islamic state. 
As a follow-up to the Medan 
congress, on April 29, 1953 Daud 
Beureu’eh led a PUSA congress 
in Langsa, East Aceh. Following 
24Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan,p. 47.
25Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 47.
this congress, PUSA established an 
organization which consisted of former 
Aceh combatants. The congress then 
encouraged the participants to persuade 
people to vote for Islamic parties in the 
next general election.
The next phase of the rebellion 
was marked by the establishment of 
mass organizations such as Pandu Islam 
(Islamic Scout) under the leadership of 
A. Gani Mutyara. The dormant Pemuda 
PUSA (PUSA Youth) was also revived. 
Pandu Islam, Pemuda PUSA, and other 
mass organizations were also given 
military training.26 In order to gather 
the popular support, Daud Beureu’eh 
conducted a visitation to various 
areas in Aceh. In each area, Daud 
Beureu’ehannounced the decisions of 
the Medan congress. He also reminded 
the people to keep vigilant about any 
incident that might occur in the future.27
Daud Beureu’eh’s next move 
was establishing contact with S. M. 
Kartosuwiryo. He was even appointed 
as the Governor of Darul Islam in 
Aceh. This information was delivered 
by Mustafa Rasyid, an emissary from 
Kartosuwiryo who was arrested on May 
1, 1953. A secret message indicated 
that Daud Beureu’eh and Amir Husen 
Al Mujahid even went to Bandung to 
hold a meeting with the leaders of Darul 
Islam. This visit was the follow-up of a 
secret meeting which decided to send 
two delegates to Bandung. This secret 
meeting was held on March 13, 1953 
and was attended by Husen Al Mujahid, 
Hasan Ali, Sayed Abubakar, and A. R. 
Hanafiyah.28
26Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 48.
27Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 48.
28Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p.49; and C. van Dijk, Darul Islam: 
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In December 1953, another 
secret meeting was held in Daud 
Beureu’eh’s residence and was 
attended by approximately one hundred 
representatives from various areas 
throughout Aceh. The meeting discussed 
strategies for launching a coup d’état 
and for establishing a military region. 
The climax of the meeting was the 
proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia 
or NII (Islamic State of Indonesia)in 
Aceh on December 20, 1953.29
The establishment of the Islamic 
State of Indonesia in Aceh was originally 
planned to be proclaimed on August 
7, 1953. This plan was then postponed 
until August 17, 1953, as recommended 
by Mohammad Hatta. Because of lack 
of preparation, this plan was further 
postponed until mid-December 1953.30 
After several postponements, the 
establishment of the Islamic State of 
Indonesia in Aceh was finally proclaimed 
at midnight on December 20, 1953. At 
the same time, President Soekarno and 
other high officials of the Indonesian 
Republic were visiting Medan to attend 
the Pekan Olahraga Nasional or PON 
III (the Third National Sports Week).31
3. Confronting the DI/TII Rebellion 
in Aceh 
The establishment of Darul 
Islam or NII in Aceh triggered various 
reactions. Some suggested a full-
blown military offensive, while others 
suggested peaceful negotiations. The 
first option was mostly championed by 
Sebuah Pemberontakan. Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 
p.282.
29Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 50. 
30Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, 50; andC. van Dijk, Darul Islam: Se-
buah Pemberontakan, p. 285.
31Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, 50.
PUSA’s political opponents such as PKI 
and PNI, whereas the second option was 
championed by Islamic parties such as 
Masyumi.
The first response made by the 
Commander of Regiment I Infantry 
in Kutaraja to this proclamation was 
making a military announcement. This 
announcement informed the people that 
a rebellion had erupted and that they had 
to remain calm and vigilant. Besides 
that, the people were alsoencouraged to 
fully support the state apparatus in their 
effort to quench the rebellion.32
Similar response was also made 
by some factions within the ulemas who 
did not agree with Daud Beureu’eh. 
These ulemas were Hasan Krueng Kalee, 
Teungku Makam, Teungku Abdul Salam 
Meuraksa, Teungku Saleh Meugit Raya, 
Teungku Muda Wali, and Labuhan Haji. 
They stated that Daud Beureu’eh and 
his proponents were actually taking 
the wrong course of action. They also 
encouraged those who opposed the 
rebellion to persuade those who joined 
the rebellion to give up violence and 
take the right course of action.33
Three days after the establishment 
of Darul Islam in Aceh, the Communist 
Party of Indonesia went to the office 
of North Sumatra Governor to demand 
that the government launch a counter-
rebellion movement called Anti Teror 
Aceh (Antiterrorist Movement in Aceh) 
in which the common people were to be 
armed against the rebels. Before sending 
a full delegation of twenty people, PKI 
had sent two representatives to meet the 
governor, but they were all refused by the 
32Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 64.
33Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 65.
Buletin Al-Turas 
Mimbar Sejarah,Sastra,Budaya, dan Agama - Vol. XXII No.1, Januari 2016
155
governor.34Meanwhile, the Indonesian 
National Party established a “National 
Front” which was then renamed 
Gabungan Partai-Partai dan Organisasi 
or GPO (Alliance of Political Parties 
and Organizations). This movement 
united various parties and organizations 
throughout Aceh. This movement 
demanded that the government require 
everyvillage to establish “Pagar Desa” 
(literally “Village Fence”) movement in 
which the villagers were to be armed to 
protect themselves against the rebels.35
In response to the DI/TII 
rebellion in Aceh, the government of 
the Indonesian Republic organized 
special meetings. In a meeting which 
was attended by Prime Minister Zainul 
Arifin, the Minister of Defense, the 
Attorney General, the ArmyChief of 
Staff of Indonesia, and the National 
Police Chief, it was decided that the 
central government would send a large 
military force to Aceh.36
Harian Rakyatreported on 
September 24, 1953that the Communist 
Party of Indonesia made this following 
statement:
“There is only one thing that the 
government can do: they have 
to unite with the people to crush 
these separatists. With regard to 
this matter, PKI sincerely and 
wholeheartedly declared that our 
party gives its full support to the 
government of the Republic of 
34Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan,p. 65; andM. Nur El Ibrahimy, (1982), 
Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureu’eh: Per-
anannya dalam Pergolakan di Aceh. Jakarta: PT 
Gunung Agung, 1980, p. 100.
35Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 65; Nur El-Ibrahimy,Teungku Mu-
hammad Daud Beureu’eh,p. 100-101.
36Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p.65.
Indonesia in suppressing the Darul 
Islam [rebellion] in Aceh, West 
Java, and elsewhere.37
On September 26, 1953Keng 
Pofeatured a statement by Sudibyo, the 
leader of Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 
or PSII (Indonesian Islamic Union 
Party). He said that Islamic parties still 
hoped for a peaceful settlement on the 
grounds that the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh 
was not an expression of Aceh people’s 
hatred towards the central government. 
This conviction could be proven by the 
fact that, during the struggle period, 
the Aceh people provided considerable 
assistance for the Republic of Indonesia. 
Because of that, the problem of DI/
TII in Aceh could still be settled in an 
amicable manner. He also said that the 
best way was to let the ulemassolve the 
problem by themselves because this 
rebellion rose from the ulemas.38
On October 28, 1953, the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia 
issued an official statement concerning 
DI/TII in Aceh. The statement consisted 
of four chapters. The first chapter 
offered a historical account covering 
events from the proclamation of the DI/
TII rebellion in Aceh to the responses 
made by the central government with 
regard to the rebellion. The second 
chapter explained the background of 
the rebellion which could be traced 
back to the Kingdom of Aceh. The third 
chapter described the actions taken by 
the central government to suppress the 
rebellion. The fourth chapter described 
the actions which would be taken by 
the central government with regard to 
regional government’s policies.39
37Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 65.
38Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan,p.66.
39Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
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The third chapter mentioned that 
the government took various measures 
to deal with the rebellion. These 
measures consisted of localizing the 
rebel forces, improving internal security, 
strengthening military posts, securing 
logistic routes between military posts, 
and sending new troops to increase 
the number of those already stationed 
in Aceh. Besides that, the central 
government also offered scholarships 
for Acehnese students who studied 
outside Aceh.40
The fourth chapter mentioned 
that, in order to suppress the DI/TII 
rebellion in Aceh, the government of the 
Indonesian Republic invited the ulemas 
who did not side with the rebels to win 
back those who had joined the rebellion. 
The government also promised that, 
when the situation was back to normal, 
they would bring development to Aceh 
in all areas, particularly in the form of 
railways and roads.41
The central government’s effort to 
suppress the DI/TII rebellion Aceh was 
marked by contrasting opinions which 
ensued not only from regional parties and 
organizations, but also from the cabinets 
which ran the Indonesian government 
from time to time during the rebellion. 
This situation led to the adoption of 
different and sometimes conflicting 
policies by each administration, while 
the policies of these cabinets were 
greatly influenced by the ruling party.42
4. Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet
The Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet 
Keutuhan,p. 67.
40Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 68.
41Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 67.
42Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 68.
was one of the cabinets which had to 
deal with DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. 
The cabinet resorted to full military 
operations in order to suppress the 
rebellion. At that time, the government’s 
army managed to seize control of cities, 
even though the hinterland remained 
largely controlled by DI/TII. 43
The government’s military force 
took offensive measures in countering 
DI/TII’s attacks on Indonesian military 
posts. Each attack was responded by 
arsons, random arrests, and on-sight 
shootings. For example, a DI/TII’s 
attack on a Mobile Brigade convoy in 
Cot Tuphah village near Bireuen in early 
September 1954 prompted the Army to 
arrest eighty five people.44
Besides in Aceh, many people 
were also arrested in other cities such as 
Jakarta, Medan, and Palembang. Several 
PUSA top leaders were arrested in Medan, 
such as Hasjmy, Syeh Marhaban, and 
Nyak Neh Rica. The central government 
also took action against Acehnese 
soldiers who were associated with Darul 
Islam, such as Major Hasballah Haji, a 
military commander in Medan, who was 
transferred to the Indonesian Army’s 
Headquarters in Jakarta.45
In addition to military actions, the 
Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet also sought 
for rapprochement with the supporters 
of DI/TII by appointing S. M. Amin, a 
Masyumi politician, as the Governor 
of North Sumatra. By implementing 
this policy, the cabinet attempted to 
improve its image among the Acehnese 
43Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.68.
44Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.68.
45Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 70.
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people.46 Moreover, the cabinet also 
appointed the uléëbalangs and BKR 
members as counselorsat military bases. 
Furthermore, the cabinet also supported 
the ulemas from Persatuan Tarbiyah 
Islamiyah or Perti (Union for Islamic 
Education), who opposed PUSA’s 
rebellion, to dissociate the Acehnese 
people from DI/TII.47
In addition to those policies, 
the Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet also 
introduced some policies concerning the 
development of Aceh. The government 
promised to give a financial assistance of 
twenty million rupiahs to the Acehnese 
people. The government also promised 
to construct roads, to build irrigation 
facilities, to provide electricity, and 
to improve education in Aceh. These 
plans were even incorporated into the 
1953/1954 National Budget. However, 
this policy was not fully welcomed by 
the opposition group. DI/TII said that 
the policy only proved that the previous 
cabinets had mistreated the Acehnese 
people.48
The cabinet’s policies attracted 
much criticism. In the parliament, 
opposition parties such as Masyumi 
and the Socialist Party expressed their 
severe criticisms against the cabinet. 
Mohammad Natsir, a Masyumi 
politician, severely criticized the 
cabinet’s harsh and arbitrary treatment 
of Aceh. Natsir thought that the DI/TII 
problem in Aceh could only be settled 
through negotiations. Besides that, many 
central and regional-level newspapers 
also criticized the government. 
46Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.70; and Sjamsuddin, Pemberon-
takan Kaum Republik, p. 129.
47Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 70.
48Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.71.
Criticisms were not only directed 
towards the cabinet’s military actions, 
but also towards the fact that the cabinet 
had admitted too many uléëbalangs 
into the regional government.49 Those 
criticisms eventually forced the central 
government to send a diplomatic 
mission to Aceh whose aim was to offer 
a recommendation on the reorganization 
of Aceh regional government. In addition 
to that, the central government was also 
expected to take account of local factors 
and not to give too much privilege to the 
uléëbalangs and their supporters.50
The central and regional 
governments did not always work in 
harmony with regard to their policies 
on DI/TII. For example, Governor S. M. 
Amin established a personal relationship 
with DI/TII leaders in the hope that 
Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo 
would change his attitude if this strategy 
proved successful. Governor S. M. 
Amin argued that military measures 
would not stop the DI/TII rebellion. 
This was clearly in contrary to the Prime 
Minister’s view who was confident that 
the DI/TII rebellion would shortly be 
crushed by military offensives.51
In his effort to create peace, S. 
M. Amin sent a personal letter (dated 
December 5, 1953)52 to Daud Beureu’eh, 
49Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 71.
50Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 72.
51Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. pp.72-73.
52Below is quoted from a letter which was sent 
by S. M. Amin:
Medan, December 5, 1953.
The Honorables:
Tgk. M. Daud Beureu’eh, Hasan Aly, Tgk. M. 
Husin el Mudjahid, Husin Jusuf and others.
Dear my fellow countrymen, This letter is sent 
as a personal letter, bearing with it a great hope 
that it may assist us in our effort to put an end 
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Hasan Ali, Husen Al-Mujahid, and other 
Darul Islam leaders which basically 
tried to persuade them to settle the 
conflict in an amicable way. The letter 
was answered by Husen Al-Mujahid 
who told the Governor that peaceful 
settlement was always possible as long 
as there was goodwill on both sides. Two 
other letters were sent to the leaders of 
Darul Islam on March 8 and April 10, 
1954 by courier, but none of them ever 
reached their destination.53
S. M. Amin’s effort failed to 
convince the central government, and 
the central government prohibited 
the governor to maintain any further 
personal contact with Darul Islam. The 
central government also stated that they 
would not enter into any agreement with 
Darul Islam. The situation became worse 
when Darul Islam sent a letter (dated 
June 1, 1954) which demanded that the 
central government acknowledge Aceh 
as part of Darul Islam movement.54 The 
to the enmity which has been raging between 
you and the Government of the Republic of In-
donesia and a belief that you would be willing to 
demonstrate your goodwill to work together to 
achieve the same goal.
This belief is based on my knowledge about your 
persons and on my conviction that all that have 
happened from the past until this present day, 
which has unfortunately led to much spilling of 
blood, are essentially caused by misunderstand-
ing.
In consideration of that, I hope that you, out of 
your sincere willingness, would be so kind as to 
enlighten us about the possible ways that can 
be explored to put an end to this massive blood-
shed, for the mutual interests of us all.
Looking forward to your reply!
A copy is also sent to my friend,
SAID ABUBAKAR
in Penang.
Best regards
signed by
Mr. S. M. Amin
53Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.73.
54Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
written correspondence between S. M. 
Amin and the leaders of Darul Islam 
was thus ended because the Governor 
was disappointed with Darul Islam’s 
response. S. M. Amin then sent a final 
letter which ordered Darul Islam to 
surrender. In response to the letter, Darul 
Islam officially declared a rebellion.55
5. Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet
This cabinet was led by Burha-
nuddin Harahap from Masyumi, so it 
was only natural that the government’s 
approach towards DI/TII now became 
more lenient than in the previous ad-
ministration. Muhammad Hatta’s effort 
to solve the DI/TII problem through 
amicable consensus—which came to a 
halt during the First Ali Sastroamidjodjo 
Cabinet—was resumed during the Bur-
hanuddin Harahap Cabinet.
Prime Minister Burhanuddin 
Harahap sent two emissaries, Hasbal-
lah Daud (Daud Beureu’eh’s son) and 
Abdullah Arief, to negotiate with Daud 
Beureu’eh. This negotiation achieved a 
better result. The leaders of the rebellion 
also agreed to support Islamic parties in 
the upcoming general election and not to 
disturb the general election.56
In September Hasbullah Daud and 
Abdullah Arief returned with promising 
results. The Prime Minister immedi-
ately told Governor S. M. Amin about 
the government’s reasons for opening 
a negotiation with DI/TII. The Gover-
nor immediately tried to reopen a per-
sonal written correspondence with DI/
TII leaders which had been broken for 
a while. Unfortunately, because of vari-
ous impediments, his letters were never 
Keutuhan. p.73.
55Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 73.
56Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 74.
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received by the addressees.57
Prime Minister Burhanuddin Har-
ahap sent another delegation to DI/TII 
in Aceh with Abdullah Arief as the gov-
ernment’s representative. In the meeting 
which took place from October 28 to 
November 1 [1954?], it was agreed that, 
in order to secure a successful conclu-
sion, both parties would declare a cease-
fire. Daud Beureu’eh demanded that the 
negotiation be formal and open, not in-
formal or closed.58
However, on the one hand, the 
Prime Minister could not accept the 
terms requested by Daud Beureu’eh with 
regard to the open nature of the meeting 
because it would mean that the central 
government acknowledged Darul Islam. 
On the other hand, the Prime Minister 
did not want to lose the sympathy of 
Masyumi’s supporters in Aceh. There-
fore, the Prime Minister chose to delay 
issuing any policy on DI/TII. This ac-
tion reignited the tension between both 
parties.59
In response to the protracted con-
flict between the central government 
and DI/TII, Kongres Mahasiswa, Pemu-
da, Pelajar, dan Masyarakat Aceh se-In-
donesia(the Congress of Aceh Students, 
Youths, and Communities throughout 
Indonesia) was organized in Medan 
from September 15 to 19, 1956. This 
congress was attended by representa-
tives from various organizations in and 
outside Aceh. The congress was also 
attended by the ulemas and representa-
tives from mass organizations through-
out Indonesia. The congress was chaired 
57Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 75.
58Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.75.
59Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.75.
by a presidium with Teungku Abdul 
Sjam as its chairperson and Anis Idham 
as its secretary. The congress resulted 
in several decisions and resolutions and 
prepared a plan for the development of 
Aceh.60
Not long after the congress, a re-
union of the former soldiers of Divisi 
Gajah 1(literally “Elephant Division 1”) 
was held from October 9 to 12, 1956 
in Yogyakarta. All of the participants 
agreed that the stability in Aceh had to 
be achieved through peaceful negoti-
ations. It was also agreed that the duty 
of maintaining security in Aceh had to 
be borne by the people of Aceh. Besides 
that, the reunion also led to the forma-
tion of a command for maintaining se-
curity under the direct control of the Na-
tional Army Staff.61
In the 1955 General Election, 
Masyumi won two-thirds of Aceh peo-
ple’s votes. This new development 
helped pave the way towards a peaceful 
settlement between DI/TII and the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Indonesia. 
When the Second Ali Sastroamidjod-
jo Cabinet came to power, the govern-
ment eventually issued Law Number 
24 of November 24, 1956regarding the 
Establishment of the Province of Aceh. 
Ali Hasymi was elected as the Governor 
of Aceh, while Sjamun Gaharu was ap-
pointed as the Commander of Aceh Mil-
itary Command.62
However, the enactment of Law 
Number 24 of November 24, 1956 re-
garding the Establishment of the Prov-
60Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.76; Hasjmy, 1984,”Darul Islam: 
Perjalanan Sejarah”, Sinar Darussalam, No. 
139. 61.
61Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.76.
62Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.76.
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ince of Aceh did not automatically stop 
the DI/TII rebellion against the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Indonesia. 
It would,take quite a long time before 
Daud Beureu’eh eventually proclaimed 
his peace declaration. In spite of this, the 
enactment of Law did facilitate further 
efforts towards peace. Under the leader-
ship of Ali Hasymi and Sjamun Gaharu, 
Aceh entered a new stage in its history 
when the regional government started to 
adoptmore prudent and peaceful strate-
gies to bring about reconciliation with 
the rebel forces.
6. End of the Rebellion
In order to achieve reconciliation 
with the rebel forces, Sjamun Gaharu, 
the Commander of Aceh Military Com-
mand, formulated an idea which he 
called “Konsepsi Prinsipil Bijaksana” 
(literally “Wise Principal Conception”). 
This idea involved abandoning mili-
tary operations and seeking for political 
settlement. In order to achieve this, the 
government and DI/TII had to work to-
gether to seek for a solution tosettle the 
Aceh problem.63 In mid-1957, the gov-
ernment convened a negotiation with a 
number of DI/TII leaders in the village 
of Lam Teh. This negotiation is known 
as “Ikrar Lam Teh” (literally the “Lam 
Teh Pledge”). In this negotiation, both 
parties pledged to support the develop-
ment of Islam, as well as to bring pros-
perity and security to the Aceh people. 
Besides that, both parties also agreed to 
announce a ceasefire. However, in spite 
of this effort, Daud Beureu’eh still re-
fused to compromise because he main-
tained that Aceh would only enter into 
negotiations with the Republic of Indo-
nesia if the central government recog-
nized Aceh’s status as an Islamicstate 
within the Unitary State of the Republic 
63Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 76.
of Indonesia.64
Following the “Lam Teh Pledge”, 
both parties ceased to engage in armed 
struggle, even though there was no de-
finitive sign that DI/TII would surren-
der yet. This ceasefire survived until 
1959 and paved the way towards peace. 
Many DI/TII supporters then decided to 
end their rebellion and return to the Uni-
tary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
At the beginning of 1959, DI/TII 
in Aceh began to show signs of disin-
tegration. They were divided into three 
factions. The first faction consisted of 
Teungku Daud Beureu’eh and his fol-
lowers who insisted on their initial de-
mands and refused any kind of com-
promise. The second faction consisted 
of the members of the Islamic Armed 
Forces of Indonesia, such as Ayah Gani, 
Hasan Saleh, Amir Husin Al-Mujahid, 
A. Gani Mutiara, Muhamad Amin, Ah-
mad Hasan, and Ishak Amir. This fac-
tion tended to adopt a milder attitude to-
wards the Indonesian government. The 
third faction consisted of Hasan Ali and 
other members of the Islamic Armed 
Forces of Indonesiawho remained loyal 
to Daud Beureu’eh.
A “Dewan Revolusi” (literally the 
“Revolutionary Council”) was estab-
lished on March 15, 1959 by the Majlis 
Syuro(People’s Representative Council) 
of the State of Aceh. Daud Beureu’eh’s 
leadership, both civil and military, was 
taken over by Hasan Saleh, a TII Col-
onel who at that time was also acting 
as the Minister of War. In addition to 
that, the cabinet was also reshuffled.65 
In a pronouncement signed by Amir 
Husin al-Mujahid, the Revolutionary 
64Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.77.
65Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 78.
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Council declared its desire to bring em-
inence and happiness to the people of 
Aceh. The Revolutionary Councilthen 
proceeded to issue the Statement of the 
Head of NBA/NII on March 26, 1959. 
The Statement indicated that the Revo-
lutionary Council would continue nego-
tiations with the government of the Re-
public of Indonesia and that they would 
consider this policy as “a principle, but 
not a tactic”.66
In response to the establishment of 
the Revolutionary Council, Daud Beu-
reu’eh remained silent and avoided an 
open war. This was because Daud Beu-
reu’eh was very confident that he would 
be able to force the ulemas and the 
Acehnesepeople to suppress the Revo-
lutionary Council. Daud Beureu’eh had 
reasons to be confident because several 
DI/TII leaders such as Salah Adri had 
defected from the Revolutionary Coun-
cil. The same action was then taken by 
one of his followers, Abdurrahman Has-
jim, who organized the “Operasi Badak 
Hitam” (literally the “Black Rhinoceros 
Operation”) to bring down the Revo-
lutionary Council. This plan, however, 
was cancelled by Daud Beureu’eh.67
Because popular support to the 
Revolutionary Council was getting 
stronger, Daud Beureu’eh eventually 
decided to cooperate with Pemerintah 
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or 
PRRI (the Revolutionary Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia). Some 
of PRRI leaders came to Aceh to meet 
Daud Beureu’eh and expressed their 
willingness to supply arms to Negara 
Bagian Aceh or NBA (the State of Ace-
h).68 Some of PRRI leaders were then 
66Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 78.
67Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.79.
68Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
appointed as NBA’s military counselors. 
With this new support, NBA then began 
to consolidate its forces and prepared 
itself to bring down the Revolutionary 
Council.69
By cooperating with PRRI, NBA 
became stronger and even succeeded in 
preventing the Revolutionary Council 
from taking over areas under the influ-
ence of Daud Beureu’eh. Daud Beu-
reu’eh also managed to regain people’s 
support, which was marked by the defec-
tion of one regiment of the Revolution-
ary Council in Aceh Besar Regency to 
Daud Beureu’eh. This regiment refused 
to arrest NBA leaders who campaigned 
against the Revolutionary Council.70 In 
spite of this ominous situation, Sjamaun 
Gaharu still preferred an amicable set-
tlement. Even though he supported the 
Revolutionary Council, it was not possi-
ble for him to launch military offensives 
to suppress NBA because this would 
weaken people’s support to the regional 
government. If this happened, the peo-
ple would transfer their allegiance to 
Daud Beureu’eh.71
Sjamaun Gaharu was concerned 
that all efforts towards peace would be 
hampered because antagonisms with-
in the Revolutionary Council had been 
known by the public, including its po-
litical opponents. Sjamaun Gaharu’s 
policies to resolve the conflict through 
peaceful negotiations were also crit-
icized by anti-PUSA groups such as 
Perti and the uléëbalangs. Members of 
the Regional People’s Representative 
Council also criticized the Command-
Keutuhan. p.79.
69Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, 
p. 297.
70Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 80.
71Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 80.
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er’s policy to organize a negotiation be-
tween the rebels and the Revolutionary 
Council.72
In addition to local oppositions, 
Sjamaun Gaharu and the Revolution-
ary Council also had to face opposition 
from the central government. The Rev-
olutionary Council conducted a meeting 
with A. H. Nasution as the Indonesian 
ArmyChief of Staff to grant Aceh the 
status of a Special Region, but this plan 
fell through when it was proposed to 
the Djuanda Cabinet and the President. 
At a meeting between Ishak Amin (the 
representative from the Revolutionary 
Council) and Prime Minister Djuanda, 
the Prime Minister said that the govern-
ment could not grant Aceh the status of 
a Special Region in spite of the fact that 
this had been promised by the Army. 
The main reason was that, in Djuanda’s 
opinion, there could not be any Special 
Region in Indonesia other than Yogya-
karta.73
Unsatisfied by the cabinet’s policy, 
the Revolutionary Council threatened to 
launch a rebellion. In response to this 
threat, the Prime Minister then called a 
cabinet meeting. Sjamaun Gaharu and 
Hasjmi were also invited to attend the 
meeting. They said that peace couldon-
ly be achieved if the central govern-
ment was willing to honor the Lam Teh 
Pledge, that is, by granting Aceh the sta-
tus of a Special Region.74 A negotiation 
between the government of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia and the Revolutionary 
Councilwas then conducted on May 26, 
1959. The central government was rep-
resented by Deputy Prime Minister Har-
72Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 80.
73Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 81.
74Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 81.
di, whereas the Revolutionary Council 
was represented by Teuku Abdul Gani 
Usman and Hasan Saleh. The Regional 
Government of Aceh was represented 
by Governor A. Hasjmi as the leader of 
the delegation, with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Teuku Hamzah, Major Nak Adam Ka-
mil, Regent Zaini Bakri, and others as 
members.75
The negotiation resulted in a de-
cision that the Revolutionary Council 
would return to the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia on the grounds 
that Indonesia had readopted the 1945 
Constitution. After hearing the state-
ment, Deputy Prime Minister Hardi is-
sued Government’s Decision regarding 
the Transformation of the Province of 
Aceh into Aceh Special Region. Hence, 
Aceh was granted special autonomy in 
the areas of religion, education, and tra-
dition.76
This negotiation further weak-
ened the NBA’s position, in spite of the 
fact that the state was still supported 
by thirty percent of its original follow-
ers.77 This situation prompted NBA to 
strengthen its cooperation with PRRI 
which culminated in the establishment 
of Republik Persatuan Islam or RPI (Is-
lamic Unity Republic)78 on February 8, 
1960. Following this declaration, PRRI 
and NBA were officially abolished.79
RPI’s establishment was a sur-
75Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.81.
76Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p.82.
77C. van Dijk, Darul Islam: Sebuah Pemberon-
takan, p. 318.
78The Islamic United Republic consisted of ten 
states, including Aceh under the official name of 
Republik Islam Acehor RIA (the Islamic Repub-
lic of Aceh).
79Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 82.
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prise for KDMA. Some of its staff, 
including Teuku Hamzah, KDMA’s 
Chief of Staff who had replaced Sjam-
aun Gaharu, blamed the previous Chief 
of Staff for being too lenient to Daud 
Beureu’eh (quoted from an interview 
between Gade Ismail and Sjamaun Ga-
haru on August 16, 1991). Next, Teuku 
Hamzah effectively ended Sjamaun Ga-
haru’s “Wise Principal Conception” by 
deploying military forces in February 
1960. This military offensive was not 
known by Sjamaun Gaharu because at 
that time he was still in Jakarta.80 Colo-
nel Teuku Hamzah told the central gov-
ernment that Sjamaun Gaharu had to 
leave Aceh and attend a special course 
for senior staff at Sekolah Staf dan Ko-
mando Angkatan Darat(the Army Staff 
and Command School) in Bandung, 
while Teuku Hamzah had to remain in 
Aceh as an Acting Commander. Sjam-
aun Gaharu was outraged by these or-
ders and in return put Colonel Teuku 
Hamzah under house arrest at the end of 
August 1960.81
The next military commander re-
placing Sjamaun Gaharu was Colonel 
Muhammad Yasin. He was an instruc-
tor at the Army Staff and Command 
School in Bandung. He was well-known 
as a deeply religious officer who had a 
close relationship with the Aceh people. 
Therefore, Muhammad Yasin’s policies 
were essentially the same as, or even 
more lenient than, Sjamaun Gaharu’s.82
Ever since he assumed the mil-
itary leadership of Aceh, Muhammad 
Yasin was always in favor of peaceful 
approaches. He reestablished contact 
80Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 82.
81Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 83.
82Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 83.
with the rebel leaders, even though this 
did not mean that he entirely abandoned 
military efforts. Muhammad Yasin did 
not want the people to get an impression 
that he gave harsh treatment to the reb-
els. Therefore, he only launched small 
scale military advances. Besides that, 
these advances were led by Nyak Adam 
Kamil, an army officer who was a native 
of Aceh.83
Yasin believed that the DI/TII re-
bellion in Aceh could only be ended by 
addressing two principal aspects: physi-
cal and psychological. On the one hand, 
he was confident that his troops could 
crush the RIA militia which at the end 
of 1960 was reported to possess only 
2,500 troops, 1,500 light guns, 52 ma-
chine guns, 12 bazookas, and five mor-
tars.84 In spite of this report, he argued 
that physical suppression could only 
produce temporary physical security, 
while psychological security would re-
main unprotected. In his opinion, such 
superficial sense of security would only 
cause more problems in the future. Yasin 
therefore invited the rebels to surrender 
by their own will, so that psychological 
reconciliation can be truly achieved. In 
return of this capitulation, he offered a 
general amnesty to RIA leaders which 
would be declared by President Soekar-
no at the 1960 celebration of Indone-
sia’s Independence Day.85
Yasin’s invitation was not seri-
ously contemplated by the rebels. Very 
few TII members accepted Yasin’s invi-
tation. Besides that, Yasin’s call for the 
Aceh people not to provide any form of 
support to the rebels did nothing to stop 
83Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 83.
84Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, 
p. 323.
85Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 84.
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the rebellion. This was becauseDaud 
Beureu’eh still exerted great influence 
among his followers. Daud Beureu’eh 
also ignored the threats of both the In-
donesian central government and the 
Aceh regional government in Kutaraja 
which declared the promised amnesty 
would only apply for those who surren-
dered before October 5, 1961.86
Yasin immediately reestablished 
written correspondence with Daud Beu-
reu’eh, which yielded some positive re-
sults. In his first letter dated march 1961, 
Yasin, addressing Daud Beureu’eh 
as “ayahanda” (literally “eminent fa-
ther”), asked Daud Beureu’eh to resume 
his place among the Aceh people. As a 
token of goodwill, Yasin offered Daud 
Beureu’eh a Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. 
The letter received a warm reply, but 
Daud Beureu’eh also criticized Yasin’s 
attempt to influence the Aceh people in 
many places who, in the government’s 
opinion, did not give a positive response 
to the government’s approaches.87
At the beginning of August 1961, 
Daud Beureu’eh sent A. R. Masjim to 
meet Yasin in Kutaraja. The meeting 
was concluded by an agreement to settle 
the Aceh problem through a consensus. 
On that occasion, Yasin also expressed 
his desire to meet Daud Beureu’eh per-
sonally. As a token of goodwill, Yasin 
sent a present to Daud Beureu’eh and 
his family.88
Since then, Daud Beureu’eh start-
ed to adopt a less radical approach to-
wards the regional government. This 
was partly because his influence among 
86Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 85.
87Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 85.
88Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan. p. 85;andSjamsuddin, Pemberon-
takan Kaum Republik, p. 325.
the Aceh people and his followers began 
to wane. The Aceh people also began to 
support the Indonesian government’s 
policies because the central government 
gradually began to fulfill their demands 
for autonomy. Besides that, the fast de-
velopment brought about by the Indone-
sian government and its policy in Aceh 
began to be felt by the Aceh people. The 
rebels and their supporters started to 
feel uneasy with their course of action 
because their struggle was no longer 
supported by the people. In addition to 
that, the central government’s decision 
to readopt the 1945 Constitution attract-
ed considerable support from all regions 
in Indonesia, including Aceh. After re-
claiming his position as the leader of the 
country’s executive, President Soekarno 
gave freedom to the provinces to man-
age their own territory.89 Moreover, fre-
quent defeats by the Indonesian Army 
further weakened RIA’s influence. The 
government of the Indonesian Repub-
lic also placed native people of Aceh in 
various positions in the military. This 
action placed the rebels in a great psy-
chological dilemma because it meant 
that they now had to fight against their 
own countrymen.90
In August 1961, Yasin announced 
that RIA had made peace with the re-
gional government even though Daud 
Beureu’eh had not totally surrender be-
cause he still demanded that Sharia law 
be adopted in Aceh. This announcement 
was opposed by the uléëbalangs and 
Perti, as well as by PNI and PKI. They 
disagreed with the central government’s 
plan to grantgeneral amnesty to former 
rebels. 91
89Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, pp. 85-86; andSjamsuddin, Pem-
berontakan Kaum Republik, p. 327.
90Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 87.
91Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
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In response to this opposition, 
Yasin immediately sent a delegation of 
twenty eight people which consisted 
of several regents, Moslem clerics, as 
well as army and police officers to meet 
with Daud Beureu’eh in East Aceh. As 
the leader of the delegation, Muzakkir 
Walad persuaded Daud Beureu’eh to 
resume his position as the leader of the 
Aceh people under the Republic of In-
donesia. Yasin also threatened to quell 
any faction who opposed the peace pro-
cess. On October 17, he even declared 
that he would impose death sentence to 
anybody who attempted to impede the 
government’s efforts towards creating 
peace.92
Following the meeting, many 
rebels surrendered to the regional gov-
ernment in Kutaraja. Meanwhile, Daud 
Beureu’eh, accompanied by Ilyas Leu-
be, still refused to surrender. They de-
cided to go into exile in the forest in 
East Aceh. Yasin then visited Daud 
Beureu’eh and talked to him for two and 
a half hours. Yasin eventually agreed on 
Daud Beureu’eh’s terms that the Sha-
ria law shall be adopted in Aceh. This 
agreement was officially promulgated 
on April 7, 1962 with the support from 
the Regional People’s Representative 
Council and some generals in the cap-
ital.93
After a long journey towards 
peace, a convoy of automobiles and 
buses carrying local leaders and govern-
ment officials was sent to East Aceh to 
fetch Daud Beureu’eh back to Kutaraja. 
On May 8, 1962, after praying in Kuta-
raja Mosque, for the first time after leav-
Keutuhan, p. 88.
92Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 88.Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan 
Kaum Republik, p.327.
93Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 88.
ing Kutaraja in 1950, Daud Beureu’eh 
solemnly announced that, by the order 
of his people, he now returned to his 
people. He also proclaimed that the en-
mity and conflict which had been raging 
for eight years, ten months, and twenty 
seven days officially ended that day. Af-
ter that, Daud Beureu’eh returned to his 
hometown and refused to live in a house 
provided for him by Yasin in Kutaraja.94
C. Conclusion
From the above historiography, 
it is clear that Darul Islam in Aceh was 
part of Darul Islam; this was one of the 
statesunder the Islamic State of Indo-
nesia whose capital is located in West 
Java. Darul Islam in Aceh was estab-
lished on August 7, 1953 as a protest 
against the government of the Republic 
of Indonesia which ignored their aspira-
tion for special autonomy. In addition to 
this general cause, it soon became clear 
that this rebellion also occurred because 
of conflicts of interest among various 
factions in Aceh.
The DI/TII rebellion in Aceh must 
therefore be viewed in relation to the 
competing interests of various elements 
in Aceh during that era. The Aceh peo-
ple, led by the ulemas who united un-
der Persatuan Seluruh Ulama Aceh or 
PUSA (All Aceh Islamic Scholars As-
sociation), were disappointed because 
President Soekarno did not fulfill his 
promise to grant Aceh special autonomy. 
The Aceh people felt betrayed because 
their contributions to the central gov-
ernment during the struggle period were 
ignored. Tension between Aceh and the 
central government quickly escalated 
when Aceh, which had actually become 
an autonomous region, was abolished as 
94Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap 
Keutuhan, p. 89.
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a political entity and was incorporated 
into the Province of North Sumatra.
In addition to PUSA’s disap-
pointment with the central government, 
PUSA also had a conflict with the uléë-
balangs. The uléëbalangs who resented 
the ulemas because their influence and 
power were gradually undermined by 
PUSA, especially during the early years 
of the independence period, took sides 
against PUSA. Naturally, they estab-
lished strong cooperation with the cen-
tral government. This internal conflict 
added further complication to the effort 
to create peace in Aceh. The central gov-
ernment, which had always been sup-
ported by the uléëbalangs, was eventu-
ally forced to relinquish its allegiance to 
their allies for the sake of making peace 
with DI/TII in Aceh, which was led by 
PUSA members.
Besides those two factors, the DI/
TII rebellion was also instigated by the 
parliamentary system adopted by the 
central government at that time. The 
parliamentary system had one serious 
flaw: it was so unstable that many cab-
inets held power for only a very short 
period of time. Therefore, many policies 
were left uncompleted, which included 
those concerning regional governments. 
This situation decelerated and disturbed 
the progress of development in those 
regions. This is one of the reasons why 
there were many rebellions in various 
regions throughout Indonesia at that 
time, including Aceh.
In general, there were two oppos-
ing factions in Aceh with their respective 
interests. The ulemas who united under 
PUSA demanded that Aceh’s autonomy 
be implemented in accordance to the 
Sharia law. Meanwhile, the uléëbalangs 
tried to win the favor of the government 
of the Indonesian Republic by helping it 
to combat the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. 
On the one hand, some uléëbalangs then 
turned their allegiance to Daud Beu-
reu’eh because they perceived that Daud 
Beureu’eh was greatly supported by the 
people. On the other hand, some ulemas, 
especially the members of Perti, did not 
agree with PUSA’s actions. Therefore, 
Perti was supported by the uléëbalangs 
and the central government.
Darul Islam in Aceh was led by 
Daud Beureu’eh, a charismatic and in-
fluential Moslem cleric in Aceh. Us-
ing his great influence among the Aceh 
people, he once helped the government 
of the Indonesian Republic to fight the 
Dutch colonizers. He also once encour-
aged the Aceh people to provide finan-
cial aids for the Indonesian government. 
Because of his great contributions, Daud 
Beureu’eh was appointed by the central 
government as the Military Governor of 
Aceh. However, Daud Beureu’eh then 
turned against the central government 
out of disappointment. Great support 
from the Aceh people made it difficult 
for the central government to suppress 
his rebellion. The central government 
then adopted various policies to settle 
the problem.
In order to end the DI/TII rebel-
lion in Aceh, the government of the 
Republic of Indonesia tended to favor 
non-military measures. A policy called 
the “Wise Principal Conception” which 
was proposed by Sjamaun Gaharu man-
aged to reduce the tension. This policy 
then proved to be able to suppress the 
rebellion. The government opted for 
this policy because they were aware that 
Daud Beureu’eh and the Aceh people 
had done great service for the Indone-
sian government. Besides that, DI/TII 
in Aceh was always willing to settle the 
conflict through amicable ways. 
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Being a key figure in the DI/TII 
rebellion in Aceh, Daud Beureu’eh was 
a strong-willed leader. He refused to 
surrender even though several PUSA 
members such as Hasan Saleh, Ayah 
Gani, Amir Husin Al-Mujahid, A. Gani 
Mutiara, Muhamad Amin, Ahmad 
Hasan, and Ishak Amir had given up. 
Even though Aceh had once again been 
granted autonomy, Daud Beureu’eh was 
still not satisfied. He finally decided to 
surrender only after his demand for the 
adoption of the Sharia law in Aceh had 
been granted by Military Governor Ya-
sin. Yasin’s decision was supported by 
the Regional People’s Representative 
Council and several generals in the cap-
ital city, and the policy was officially 
promulgated on April 7, 1962. Daud 
Beureu’eh then proceeded to announce 
his Peace Declaration on May 8, 1962 in 
Kutaraja Mosque.
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